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In an attempt to make the imposition of the death penalty as fairly and
evenly applied as possible, the General Assembly of Virginia, in section 17.1-
313 of the Virginia Code, has mandated proportionality review.' That
statute provides that "[a] sentence of death, upon the judgment thereon
becoming final in the circuit court, shall be reviewed on the record by the
supreme court."2 The statute further provides that,
[i]n addition to consideration of any errors in the trial enumerated by
appeal, the court shall consider and determine: 1. Whether the sentence
of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any
other arbitrary factor; and 2. Whether the sentence of death is excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant.3
A. Present Procedure
As the procedure for proportionality review presently stands, the
Supreme Court of Virginia, "may accumulate the records of all capital cases
tried within such period of time as the court may determine."4 In fact, the
records compiled by the Supreme Court of Virginia pursuant to section
17.1-313 of the Virginia Code consist only of capital cases previously re-
viewed by that court on appeal.' Defendants convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to life can neither appeal directly to the Supreme Court of
* J.D. Candidate, May 2000, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A.,
Goucher College.
1. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (Michie 1998).
2. 5 17.1-313(A) (emphasis added).
3. S 17.1-313(C).
4. S 17.1-313(E).
5. See Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 634, 642 (1999) (citing Swisher v.
Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 763,773 (1998)); Orbe v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 808, 816-17
(Va. 1999).
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Virginia nor appeal on the issue of sentence.6 Only a few such cases reach
the Supreme Court of Virginia on discretionary review. Thus, the records
compiled by the Supreme Court of Virginia consist primarily of capital cases
in which the defendant received a death sentence. Allegedly, the records of
these cases are kept on file at the supreme court to enable access for compar-
ative proportionality review.
1. Proportionality Analysis: Part One
When a sentence of death is automatically appealed to the Supreme
Court of Virginia; the case will first be reviewed to assure that the penalty
was not imposed arbitrarily or because of passion or prejudice." Section
17.1-313 of the Virginia Code states, "[tihe [supreme] court shall consider
and determine: ... [w)hether the sentence of death was imposed under the
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor."8 In conduct-
ing this review, the court focuses on the events of trial, paying particular
attention to evidence or argument to which the defense, asserting undue
prejudice, objected.
Whether to admit proffered items into evidence is a decision within the
discretion of the trial court. In Stamperv. Commonwealth,9 a case involving
possibly prejudicial evidence, the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the
record to determine whether items admitted into evidence caused the jury
to impose death under influence of passion or prejudice.1" It is important
to'note that, because the admission of evidence is a matter resting solely
within the sound discretion of the trial court, the decision to admit such
evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discietion is
demonstrated. The defendant argued to the Supreme Court of Virginia
that significant evidence, such as the murder weapon, photographs, and a
videotape sound recording graphically describing the crime scene so in-
flamed the jurors that they imposed a sentence of death under passion and
prejudice. 2 The court reviewed the evidence brought to its attention by the
defendant and determined that the jury and circuit court did not act with
passion or prejudice in imposing a sentence of death. 3 In Payne v. Common
6. See infra sections II(A)(2)( ).
7. S 17.1-313(C)(1).
8. i
9. 257 S.E.2d 808, 823 (Va. 1979).
10. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 808, 823 (Va. 1979).
11. See Stockton v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 196, 210 (Va. 1991).
12. Stamper, 257 S.E.2d 808, 823.
13. Id See also Peterson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.E.2d 520,527-28 (Va. 1983) (holding
that "admitting photographs of the victim.... admitting the testimony that (the defendant]
threatened (a witness] for testifying against him, and admitting evidence of [defendant's]
convictions of other crimes when those convictions were pending appeal" did not cause
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wealth,4 the defendant argued that the trial court and the jury acted in
response to undue passion and prejudice in imposing two sentences of
death."s The defendant asserted that the court's admission of autopsy
photographs as well as a videotape and photographs of the crime scene
"were 'unduly graphic... and [were] shown to inflame the passions of the
jury.' 6 The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the evidence shown to
the trial court and jury, to which the defendant objected, and determined
that admission of these items into evidence was not an abuse of trial court
discretion. The court ruled that passion and prejudice did not influence the
jury and the court affirmed the two death sentences. 7 It is clear that, unless
the defendant can convince the supreme court that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing the admission of the evidence, the defendant loses on
the argument that death was imposed under the influence of passion or
prejudice. In effect, the Supreme Court of Virginia equates the admissibility
standard, "more probative then prejudicial," with "not too prejudicial" to
determine the influence of passion or prejudice in reviewing a sentence of
death.
During the sentencing proceeding in Payne, the prosecutor displayed
photographs of victims while describing the defendant as a "predator" and
a "monster."18 The defendant asserted that these statements by the prosecu-
tor so inflamed the court as to cause the imposition of a sentence of death
under influence of passion and prejudice. 9 The defendant further opined
that the effect of the prosecution's characterization of the defendant "as a
'predator' and a 'monster'" was proven by the court's response to such
evidence. Specifically, Payne asserted that the prosecution's argument "'had
the desired effect on the court' because the court 'described [the defendant]
as a mad dog who should be put in a gunny sack with some bricks and
dropped off a bridge. ''2 He further contended that "this language by the
court 'is ample evidence that the sentence of death was imposed under
influence of passion and prejudice.'" 2' The Supreme Court of Virginia
decided that the statements by the court and Commonwealth alone were
influence of passion, prejudice, or arbitrary factors in the imposition of the death penalty).
14. 509 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 1999).
15. Payne v. Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 293, 297 (Va. 1999).
16. Id. (citation omitted).
17. Id. at 301.
18. Id at 299.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citation omitted).
21. Id. (citation omitted).
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not enough to show that death was imposed under influence of passion or
prejudice.22 The court affirmed both of Payne's death sentences.23
In sum, influence of passion or prejudice can enter the trial through
either potentially prejudicial evidence presented by the Commonwealth or
through inherently prejudicial arguments by the Commonwealth. The
Supreme Court of Virginia's review of evidence employs a standard that
only determines whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
each particular piece of evidence, viewed alone. The review determining
whether passion or prejudice influenced the imposition of a sentence of
death should review all of the evidence admitted in the trial and penalty
phases, and determine whether, considering all of the evidence together, the
jury was influenced in a way as to unduly heighten the desire to impose
death.- Looking at evidence piece by piece and determining whether each
piece, viewed alone, is more probative then prejudicial in no way assists in
determining whether all the evidence together could so inflame the jury as
to cause it to impose death under influence of passion or prejudice.
When the Supreme Court of Virginia reviews a claim that the Com-
monwealth's argument inflamed the jury and thus caused the imposition of
death under influence of passion or prejudice, the court uses the same abuse
of discretion standard described immediately above. The facts of Payne, in
which the Commonwealth called the defendant a "monster" and a "preda-
tor," and the court, in response to such remarks, stated that the defendant
should be "put in a gunny sack with some bricks and dropped off a bridge,"
are quite egregious."' If these facts are not enough to prove that a sentence
of death was imposed under influence of passion or prejudice, then it is
nearly impossible to establish that a sentence of death was imposed under
passion or prejudice.
2. Proportionality Analysis: Part Two
The Supreme Court of Virginia's second level of proportionality
analysis focuses primarily on whether, in light of other capital cases and
considering the defendant's conduct in committing the crime, the imposi-
tion of the death penalty was disproportionate or excessive.2" To determine
the proportionality of a sentence of death the court employs a test:
"whether generally juries in [the same] jurisdiction impose a death sentence
for conduct similar to that of the defendant."26 To answer this question the
22. Id.
23. M.'
24. Id. at 299.
25. S 17.1-313(C)(2)
26. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 808, 824 (Va. 1979) (stating that the test is
not whether a jury may have declined to recommend death in a particular case but whether
generally juries in the same jurisdiction impose the death sentence for conduct similar to that
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Supreme Court of Virginia compares the case at hand with cases that include
similar circumstances around the commission of the crime.2" In this com-
parison the court reviews the circumstances of the case on review in light of
other similar cases previously reviewed by the court to determine whether
generally juries impose the death penalty for similar conduct.28 If the review
of other cases reveals that, as a general rule, juries here imposed death for
similar circumstances, the court will find the sentence proportionate.29
When evaluating the proportionality of a death sentence, the court does
not consider it necessary that all similar cases resulted in a death sentence.30
The applicable test examines whether juries generally impose death sen-
tences in similar situations: 1 "[If in] consideration of both [the defendant]
and the crime he committed, [the court] is satisfied that, 'while there are
exceptions,' other sentencing bodies in this Commonwealth generally
imposed the supreme penalty [of death] for comparable or similar offenses,"
then a sentence of death is proportionate.32 To date there has been no
reversal of a death sentence on the grounds of proportionality.
IL Inherent Problems With the Historical and Present Comparative
Proportionality Review Procedure
Several inadequacies diminish the value of the procedure used by the
Supreme Court of Virginia in conducting proportionality review. First, the
comparative process engaged in by the court to determine whether juries
generally impose death for similar conduct is inherently inaccurate. The
compilation of records the Supreme Court of Virginia uses in the required
proportionality review does not include a complete cross section of cases.
Cases in which a capitally-convicted defendant received life imprisonment
are significantly under-represented. Second, the procedure employed by the
Supreme Court of Virginia in conducting a proportionality review comes
after having ignored a requirement mandated by section 17.1-313 of the
of the defendant).
27. S 17.1-313(C)(2).
28. See, e.g., Stamper, 257 S.E.2d at 824.
29. See Peterson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.E.2d 520, 528 (Va. 1983) (statingthat "[i]f
juries generally in Virginia impose the death sentence for conduct similar to that of the
defendant, then the sentence is not excessive or disproportionate").
30. SeeWilliamsv. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 50, 54 (Va. 1996) (concludingthat, since
juries generally impose death in similar circumstances, imposition of the death penalty was
not excessive or disproportionate) (citing Roach v. Commonwealth, 468 S.E.2d 98, 114 (Va.
1996) (concluding that, while there are exceptions, the Commonwealth generally imposed
death for conduct similar to that of the defendant, and thus, the defendant's death sentence
was not disproportionate)).
31. Id.
32. Id. (citation omitted).
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Virginia Code:3 the court does not regularly supply the circuit courts with
the compiled records of capital cases. Thus, there currently is no propor-
tionality analysis by the circuit court prior to the imposition of a jury-
recommended death sentence. As a result, the review conducted by the
Supreme Court of Virginia is a de novo review of the record rather thi a
review of the circuit court's proportionality analysis. Finally, despite the
language of section 17.1-313 of the Virginia Code, the Supreme Court of
Virginia does not include a comparison of defendants (beyond the facts of
their crimes) in its proportionality review.
A. No Effective Comparison Procedure
1. The Collected Cases
Section 17.1-313 of the Virginia Code requires the Supreme Court of
Virginia, in conducting a proportionality review, to consider available
records to guide a determination of whether a sentence of death is
excessive.34 The relevant portion of the statute reads, "[t]he court shall
consider such records as are available as a guide in determining whether the
sentence imposed in the case under review is excessive."M Because the
statute requires each death sentence be subject to review for proportionality,
the court is obligated to consider available records of other cases to deter-
mine whether death is excessive or disproportionate. 6 However, section
17.1-313 on the Virginia Code does not require the court actually to collect
cases. 37 Rather, section 17.1-313(E) states that "[t]he Supreme. Court may
accumulate the records of all capital felony cases tried within such period of
time as the court may determine."38 Yet, immediately following this sen-
tence the statute requires the court to conduct a comparative proportional-
ity review.3" The language is confusing. In using the term "may," the
General Assembly might have intended to either preclude a claim for relief
if the court neglected to gather every capital case or to relieve the burden on
the Supreme Court of Virginia to gather every capital conviction tried in the
circuit courts.
In fact, the Supreme Court of Virginia does not collect capital cases
from either the Virginia Court of Appeals or the Virginia circuit courts.
However, in several cases the supreme court has stated that, in reviewing for
proportionality, it compares the records of the case on review with those of
33. S 17.1-313(E).
34. Id.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. S 17.1-313(A)
37. S 17.1-313(E)
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id
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other capital cases reviewed by the court, "including capital cases where a
life sentence was imposed."'
2. Supreme Court of Virginia Capital Life Cases: Not an Effective
Representation of all Capital Life Cases
a. Death Sentenced Capital Cases Outnumber Life Sentenced Capital Cases
Since all cases in which death is imposed are automatically appealed to
the Supreme Court of Virginia, the other class of cases remaining to be
collected are the capital cases in which the defendant received a life sentence.
Though a few capital cases in which the defendant received a life sentence
have reached the Supreme Court of Virginia, they are infrequent and do not
provide a fair representation of the cases in which capital convictions
actually result in life sentences.4' If a defendant does appeal a capital murder
case upon receiving a life sentence, the Virginia Court of Appeals will
conduct the review. Only in the instance of a second and discretionary
appeal will the Supreme Court of Virginia review this kind of case. Inevita-
bly, there are very few cases heard by the supreme court in which the
defendant received a conviction for capital murder and was subsequently
sentenced to life imprisonment. 2 Thus, because the Supreme Court of
Virginia onlycompiles the cases previously heard by the court itself, there
are few cases included in the records where a capitally convicted defendant
received a life sentence.4" Because of this disparity, the pool of cases the
court uses in conducting its required comparative proportionality determi-
nation is skewed.
b. Life-Sentenced Capital Cases Reviewed by the Supreme Court of
Virginia do not Address Sentencing
None of the few cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of Virginia in
which a capitally convicted defendant received life involve an analysis of
40. Hedrick, v, Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 634, 642 (Va. 1999); see Cherrix v. Com-
monwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642, 655 (Va. 1999); Swisher v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 763, 773
(Va. 1998); Reid v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 787, 793 (1998); Fitzgerald v. Common-
wealth, 455 S.E.2d 506, 512 (Va. 1995); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 669, 676 (Va.
1995) (noting that in conducting proportionality review the Supreme Court of Virginia used
cases reviewed by the supreme court where a life sentence was imposed).
41. See Graham v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 128 (Va. 1995); Cheng v. Common-
wealth, 393 S.E.2d 599 (Va. 1990); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 341 S.E.2d 159 (Va. 1986);
Home v. Commonwealth, 339 S.E.2d 186 (Va. 1986); Harward v. Commonwealth, 330
S.E.2d 89 (Va. 1985); Morris v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 633 (Va. 1984); Simpson v.
Commonwealth, 318 S.E.2d 386 (Va. 1984); Keil v. Commonwealth, 278 S.E.2d 826 (Va.
1981); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 273 S.E.2d 784 (Va. 1981): All of these cases are examples
of life cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of Virginia.




sentencing." A conviction of capital murder permits only two possible
sentences: the circuit court may impose a sentence of death or a sentence of
life. Consequently, there are no grounds on which to challenge a life
sentence for a capital conviction.4 When the trial court imposes life and the
defendant appeals, the issues appealed are never issues of sentencing. Thus,
none of the capital cases resulting in life sentences heard by the Supreme
Court of Virginia are factually developed on the issue of sentencing. As a
result, the few capital life imprisonment cases used by the Supreme Court
of Virginia in conducting the mandated comparative proportionality review
provide little guidance to the court in evaluating the excessiveness of a death
sentence.46
Cases in which a defendant was convicted of capital murder in the
course of a robbery exemplify the failure of the few capital life cases re-
viewed by the court to represent effectively all cases in which a defendant
was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life.4' Though there are
cases in which a defendant received death for capital murder in the course
of a robbery, there are also numerous capital cases in which the defendant
committed murder during the course of a robbery and was sentenced to
life.48 Proportionality review should include "similar cases" from the
Virginia Court of Appeals in which the defendant received life imprison-
ment for a similar offense. Inclusion of capital cases in which a life sentence
was imposed by the circuit courts and in which there was no appeal would
yield an even more accurate picture of how juries treat similar cases. With-
out the inclusion of these cases comparative review is unavoidably incom-
plete and unreliable.
3. Cases Collected by the Supreme Court of Virginia do not Fairly Represent
what Sentences Juries Generally Recommend in Capital Cases
Despite the inconsistent language of section 17.1-313, the Supreme
Court of Virginia could, and should, include in its records a much broader
class of cases then it currently does. At the very least, a logical interpreta-
tion of the statute imposes a duty to compile a cross-section of both life and
death capital cases which fairly represent how juries generally sentence for
various conduct.
44. Id
45. Of course, a life sentence cannot be overturned as inadequate. Furthermore, a life
sentence received for a conviction of capital murder is an implied acquittal of death. Thus,
there is a double jeopardy bar against any further consideration of a sentence of death once
the trial court has imposed life. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 444-45 (1981)
(holding that the determination by the jury not to impose a sentence of death is a judgment
that the prosecution has not proven the case for death and thus is an acquittal thereof).
46. Ma
47. See infra note 56.
48. See infra note 56.
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In Orbe v. Commonwealth,49 the defendant entered a convenience store
and pointed a revolver at the store clerk. After the clerk opened the cash
drawer, the defendant shot him."0 The circuit court convicted Orbe of
capital murder in the commission of a robbery and sentenced him to death
on a finding of future dangerousness."1 Orbe appealed his case to the Su-
preme Court of Virginia. On appeal, the court conducted the mandated
comparative proportionality review of his death sentence.5 2 In its compara-
tive assessment, the court stated that the Virginia Code,
requires us to determine whether the sentence of death in this case is
"excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant." Pursuant to Code S 17.1-
313(E), we have accumulated the records of all capital murder cases
reviewed by this Court. The records include not only those capital
murder cases in which the death penalty was imposed, but also those
cases in which the trial court or jury imposed a life sentence and the
defendant petitioned this court for an appeal. s3
In the comparative review the court focused specifically on cases with facts
similar to the facts of Orbe's case. The court narrowed the review to
include only cases where "an employee was murdered in a business estab-
lishment."' Although the court reviewed cases from its own docket with
similar facts, the court neglected a large selection of cases that also have
similar facts. The court's proportionality analysis in Orbe was incomplete.
Numerous cases in the Virginia Court of Appeals, which have facts similar
to those in Orbe, resulted in a conviction for capital murder in the commis-
sion of a robbery and an imposition of a life sentence." Many of these cases
49. Orbe v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 808, 810 (Va. 1999).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 809.
52. Id at 816.
53. Id (citing Whitley v. Commonwealth, 286 S.E.2d 162, 171 (Va. 1982); quoting S
17.1-313(E)).
54. Id.
55. In each of the following cases, the defendant was convicted under section 18.2-31.4
of the Virginia Code and received a life sentence. Williams v. Commonwealth, 517 S.E.2d
246,248 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) reb'ggranted, 518 S.E.2d 858 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (the defendant
and an acquaintance broke into a crack house where they knew the seller was alone, killed
the dealer, and stole the "dope" from the house); McLean v. Commonwealth, 516 S.E.2d 717,
719 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (the defendant, along with three others, killed a man by slamming
a concrete splash block on the victim's face and slitting the victim's throat with a broken
bottle; defendant subsequently emptied the victim's wallet); Williams v. Commonwealth, 512
S.E.2d 133, 134 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (the defendant killed and robbed a lawyer in her law
office); Owens v. Commonwealth, No. 2259-95-1,1996 WL 666739, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Nov.
19, 1996) (the defendant and accomplice killed four people); Tate v. Commonwealth, No.
1774-95-2, 1996 WL 343898, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. June 25, 1996) (convictions for capital
murder, first degree murder, second degree murder, three counts of use of a firearm in the
commission of the murders, breaking and entering with a deadly weapon, and grand larceny
1999]
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also involve circumstances in which the victim was an employee of the store
or establishment the defendant robbed." In omitting these cases, and others
similar to these, from the comparative analysis, the Supreme Court of
Virginia's analysis of juries' sentencing tendencies is necessarily unreliable.
4. Inaccurate Results From an Incomplete Review for Proportionality
The incomplete nature of the record used to determine what sentence
juries tend to impose for certain conduct has significant effect on the out-
come. The overall effect of limiting the cases used by the court in propor-
tionality review to those previously heard by the court is that the majority
of cases used by the court when conducting proportionality review are cases
in which the defendant received a death sentence.5 7
The absence of life cases necessarily disrupts the procedure defined by
section 17.1-313 of the Virginia Code. By primarily considering cases in
which a death penalty was actually imposed, the court reaches an unreliable
and often incorrect result. The court merely concludes that the death
sentence in the case under review is comparable to other death sentences.
This is not an analysis of whether juries generally impose death in cases
factually similar to the one at hand. Rather, it is an analysis of whether
juries have ever imposed death in similar cases. In effect, the analysis looks
of an automobile); Tross v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 523, 526 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (the
defendant shot and killed the manager of a grocery store who stood blocking the door as
defendant and his companions attempted to steal beer); Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 427
S.E.2d 442, 443-44 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (convictions of capital murder, robbery, abduction,
and other offenses connected with a bank robbery); Mundy v. Commonwealth, 390 S.E.2d
525, 527-28 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (the defendant forced a companion to kill a hotel clerk by
putting a gun to his companion's head and stating "[i]f you don't kill him I am going to kill
you," and killed a hotel patron in the course of robbery); Walton v. Commonwealth, No.
0900-85, 1986 WL 400479, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1986) (the defendant shot the manager
of a convenience store while stealing the cash from the store's cash drawer).
This listing does not include cases in which the defendant was charged with capital
murder pursuant to section 18.2-31of the Virginia Code, but was convicted of first degree
murder. The following cases are cases in which the defendant was charged with capital
murder and convicted by a jury of first degree murder: Allen v. Commonwealth, No. 2737-
96-2, 1998 WL 49064, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1998) (the defendant killed a man and stole
money from his wallet); Braxton v. Commonwealth, 493 S.E.2d 688,689 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)
(defendant killed the victim to keep her quiet and stole from her home); Moats v. Common-
wealth 404 S.E.2d 244,245 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (the defendant robbed a convenience store and
killed the clerk); Chappell v. Commonwealth, No. 0465-85, 1986 WL 400464, at *1 (Va. Ct.
App. Oct. 10, 1986) (defendant paid an accomplice to kill the victim).
56. See S 17.1-313(E) (stating that records collected by the Supreme Court of Virginia
"shall be made available to the circuit courts").
57. See Peterson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.E.2d 520, 528 (Va. 1983) (stating that the
court reviewed for proportionality by examining "the records in all capital murder cases
reviewed by this court" and in the discussion immediately following this statement referred
to the cases examined, none of which were cases where the defendant received life imprison-
ment).
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for the minimal level of similarity necessary between cases where the defen-
dant was sentenced to death and the case at hand to conclude that death in
the case at hand is not excessive or disproportionate. Thus, when the
Supreme Court of Virginia conducts proportionality review, the significant
void of capital cases in which the defendant was sentenced to life ensures
that the review will not disclose how juries generally sentence.
B. Circuit Court Proportionality Review
1. Introduction
The Virginia Code requires that, at a minimum, the Supreme Court of
Virginia transmit the cases presently used in the required proportionality
review to the circuit courts. Historically, the Supreme Court of Virginia
has not distributed the compiled records to the circuit courts. By neglecting
to request that records be made available to them by the Supreme Court of
Virginia, defendants are partially responsible for the problem. Although the
defendant is under no duty to do so, if the defendant does move the circuit
court to request proportionality review records from the Supreme Court of
Virginia, the court is statutorily obligated to make such records available. 9
The requirement to transfer compiled records of capital cases to the circuit
courts advances a quite practical goal and creates a right in the defendant.
The circuit court judge has statutory authority to impose a life sentence
after the jury has recommended death. The facts and circumstances of the
case are never as clear on appeal as they are at the trial level, where the
circuit court has witnessed first hand the presentation of evidence and
mitigating factors. Furthermore, the transcript cannot convey to an appel-
late court the defendant's demeanor and the overall "feeling" of the trial.
Consequently, the trial judge has the most informed viewpoint from which
to conduct an effective proportionality review. Thorough proportionality
review by the trial court is important to the defendant because the standard
of review on appeal as to proportionality is significantly higher than that of
the trial court. The Supreme Court of Virginia will find reversible error on
appeal only if the trial court clearly abused its discretion in imposing a
sentence of death. Finally, and most significantly, courts lack jurisdiction
to impose sentence until the specific mandates found in sections 17.1-313
and 19.2-264.5 have been fulfilled. 60
2. Statutory Framework
The circuit courts do not presently conduct proportionality review.
Section 17.1-313 of the Virginia Code states that the records accumulated by
58. S 17.1-313(E).
59. Id
60. See Brenham v. Smith, 90 S.E. 657, 658 (Va. 1916).
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the Supreme Court of Virginia "shall be made available to the circuit
courts."6' There is no plausible purpose for this language other than to
require the Supreme Court of Virginia to make the records of other capital
cases collected for comparative proportionality review available to the
circuit courts, thereby giving the circuit courts a basis to conduct a propor-
tionality review of their own for each capital case before a sentence is im-
posed.
Section 19.2-264.5 of the Virginia Code mandates a review of a post-
sentence report and of "good cause shown" for the setting aside of the jury's
death verdict before the imposition of a sentence of death.' No better cause
exists to set aside a sentence of death than to prohibit the unfair imposition
of the country's ultimate punishment. "Good cause shown" clearly includes
a demonstration that in factually similar cases, involving similar defendants,
the trial court did not impose death. The Supreme Court of Virginia must
make available to the circuit courts upon request all records used in compar-
ative proportionality review as mandated by section 17.1-313(E) of the
Virginia Code.63 This statute, read in tandem with section 19.2-264.5 of the
Virginia Code, requires the trial court to conduct a proportionality review
of a recommenced sentence of death prior to the imposition of sentence.'
Without such review that circuit court lacks jurisdiction to impose a sen-
tence of death.65
Section 19.2-264.5 of the Virginia Code requires that "[w]hen the
punishment of any person has been fixed at death, the court shall, before
imposing a sentence, direct a probation officer of the court thoroughly to
investigate the history of the defendant and any and all other relevant facts
to the end that the court may be fully aware as to whether the sentence of
death is appropriate and just. "' The statute requires that the post-sentence
report contain the information acquired through the mandated investiga-
tion.67 Section 19.2-264.5 of the Virginia Code further provides that in the
post-sentence review of whether death is appropriate and just, the court may
"set aside the sentence of death and impose a sentence of imprisonment for
life... [a]fter consideration of the [prepared] report, and upon good cause
shown."6 Though setting aside a sentence of death and imposing a sentence
61. S 17.1-313(E) (emphasis added). To the extent the Supreme Court of Virginia
collects life sentenced records as suggested supra, section II(A), all of those records must be
included in the transmittal. However, this argument does not depend on the content of
transmitted records.
62. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.5 (Michie 1998)
63. S 17.1-313(E).
64. Id; S 19.2-264.5.
65. Brenham, 90 S.E. at 658.
66. S 19.2-264.5.
67. Id.
68. I. (emphasis added).
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of life is discretionary, the review of the post-sentence report and of good
cause shown prior to the imposition of a sentence of death is not.69 Section
19.2-264.5 of the Virginia Code mandates courts to review the post-sentence
report and to determine whether good cause for imposing a life sentence
exists.'0
Under section 19.2-264.5 of the Virginia Code, the post-sentence report
is required to contain the history of the defendant, a victim impact report
and other relevant facts.7 ' The last phrase at least includes the offense and
the circumstances surrounding it. The language of the statute requires the
review of all of this information contained in the report and review of good
cause shown.72 Thus, "good cause shown" is necessarily information sepa-
rate from and external to information included in the post-sentence report.73
This language logically leads to the conclusion that information exposing
why death should not be imposed must be reviewed by the court, and that
the defendant has an right to proffer such information for review. The most
obvious information, external to the post-sentence report, which a defen-
dant might proffer as good cause to set aside a jury recommendation of
death is information revealing that, in similar cases involving similar defen-
dants, death was not imposed. Once a jury has recommended a sentence of
death, the mandates of section 17.1-313(E) of the Virginia Code, requiring
the availability of records for comparative proportionality review to the
circuit courts, and section 19.2-264.5 of the Virginia Code, requiring a
review of good cause shown, become operative.74 Each of these statutes
creates a right in the defendant to a fulfillment of the statutory mandate
prior to the imposition of sentence.7" The statutory mandates of sections
17.1-313 and 19.2-264.5, taken together, require that the circuit courts
receive and consider proportionality evidence prior to the imposition of
sentence.
3. Accrual of Rights to Defendant
At a minimum, section 19.2-264.5 creates in the defendant a right to
have the trial judge consider proportionality evidence prior to imposing
sentence.76 Thus, when a defendant moves for proportionality review the












right to have the Supreme Court of Virginia's collected records before the
trial court.78 Thus, when the defendant moves the trial court to request
transmittal of those records from the Supreme Court of Virginia, the-trial
court must request that the Supreme Court make available the records
collected for proportionality review. Furthermore, the Supreme Court is
obligated by law to honor the trial court's request for such records.
Virginia law requires courts to honor statutory mandate for relevant
information pertaining to the crime and the defendant, including mitigation
evidence, before imposing sentence."9 Section 19.2-299 of the Virginia Code
requires that, upon request by the Commonwealth or by the'defendant, the
court must order a presentence investigation to inform the court of all
relevant information pertaining to the defendant and the crime prior to
sentencing.80 The Supreme Court of Virginia, in applying that statute,
stated that "[a] defendant convicted of a felony has an absolute right to have
a presentence investigation and report prepared upon his request and sub-
mitted to the court prior to sentencing. "" Clearly, the legislative purpose
behind this requirement is to address the importance that the court be "fully
advise[d]" of all information that may influence the court in determining the
necessary sentence.8 2
The same is true in situations where the court has convicted a defen-
dant of a crime involving sexual abnormality.83 A defendant convicted of
a crime involving sexual abnormality, upon request, has a right to defer
sentencing until a psychologist conducts a mental examination of the
78. S 17.1-313.
79. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-299 (Michie 1998) (stating "the court... on motion of
the defendant shall, [before imposing sentence] direct a probation officer of such court to
thoroughly investigate and report upon the history of the accused, including a report of the
accused record as an adult and available juvenile court records, and all other facts, to fully
advise the court so the court may determine the appropriate sentence to be imposed");
Simerly v. Commonwealth, 514 S.E.2d 387, 390 (Va. 1999) (noting that upon request the
defendant was entitled to have sentencing deferred until a mental examination was conducted
pursuant to his conviction of a crime involving "sexual abnormality"); Thomas v. Common-
wealth, No. 1690-96-2, 1997 W 191297, at *2 (Va. April 22, 1997) (stating that the defendant
has an "unequivocal right to have a presentence report completed and submitted to the court
prior to his being sentenced"); Harley v. Commonwealth, No. 1717-95-2, 1996 WL 409210,
at *1 (Va. July 23, 1996) (citing Duncan v. Commonwealth, 343 S.E.2d 392, 394 (Va. 1986)
(stating that "[a] defendant convicted of a felony has an absolute right to have a presentence
investigation and report prepared upon his request and submitted to the court prior to the
pronouncement of sentence.")).
80. S 19.2-299
81. Duncan, 343 S.E.2d at 394.
82. l
83. See Simerly, 514 S.E.2d at 390 (noting that upon request the defendant was entitled
to have sentencing deferred until a mental examination was conducted pursuant to his
conviction of a crime involving "sexual abnormality").
[Vol. 12:1
A QUARTER CENTURY: PROPORTIONALITY
defendant."4 The same logic which applies to sentencing generally under
section 19.2-299 applies to this requirement. It is necessary that courts be
fully aware of all factors relevant to sentence determination, including the
defendant's mental capacity, prior to the imposition of sentence. Both the
right to a presentence report and the right to a mental examination are
rights that accrue only upon request of the defendant. If the defendant does
request a presentence report or mental examination when convicted of a
crime involving sexual abnormality and the court does not oblige, the
sentence is voidable. In Simerly v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Court of
Appeals determined that the -trial court committed reversible error in
refusing to order a mental examination of a defendant convicted of a crime
involving "sexual abnormality" before imposing sentence.8" The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court "for the limited purpose of allowing the
court to resentence Simerly after a mental examination had been com-
pleted." 6 If the defendant does not request the review of a presentence
report or mental examination, the rights to these procedures are waived.
4. Deprivation ofJurisdiction to Impose Sentence
When a statute imposes an absolute duty on a court prior to that court
taking action, as do sections 17.1-313 and 19.2-264.5, the court is without
jurisdiction to take the action without having first performed the predicate
duty."7 Sections 17.1-313 and 19.2-264.5, viewed in concert, impose an
absolute duty on the court to conduct a review of good cause to set aside a
jury recommendation of death before imposing a sentence of death. Thus,
if a circuit court does not receive collected records for comparative propor-
tionality review from the Supreme Court of Virginia, and does not consider
whether such records amount to "good cause" to set aside a sentence of
death, the circuit court is without jurisdiction to impose sentence. The
defendant, of course, has no obligation to take any action.
5. The Constitutional Right to a Trial Level Comparative
Proportionality Determination
In Whalen v. United States,8 the United States Supreme Court deter-
mined that when a state court acts outside of its jurisdiction in imposing a
sentence, the court violates the defendant's right to due process of law. 9
84. ML
85. Id. at 391.
86. Id.
87. Brenham v. Smith, 90 S.E. 657,658 (Va. 1916) ("[Where] mandatory requirements
of the statute have been ignored, the jurisdiction of the court [is] thereby defeated, and the
proceedings rendered null and void for all purposes.")
88. 445 U.S.648, 649 (1980).
89. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980).
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The Court noted that "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment . .. prohibit[s] state courts from depriving persons of liberty or
property as punishment for criminal conduct except to the extent autho-
rized by state law."' Surely the same is true as to a deprivation of life.
Sections 19.2-264.5 and 17.1-313 of the Virginia Code mandate that a
comparative proportionality review be conducted at the trial court level
prior to the imposition of a death sentence. Thus, if a Virginia circuit court
were to impose a sentence of death without first determining if good cause,
based upon a comparative proportionality review, existed so that a sentence
of death should not be imposed, the court would exceed its jurisdiction.
That action would be a violation of the defendant's right to due process of
law protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion."'
The defendant of every criminal case in Virginia has a right granted and
guaranteed by the Virginia Constitution to present evidence in his favor.9
If a court refuses to admit evidence in the defendant's favor to establish good
cause not to impose a sentence of death, including evidence of the
disproportionality of a sentence of death, the court will violate the defen-
dant's right to the presentation of such evidence protected by the Virginia
Constitution.
C. Defendant Proportionality
The third reason why Virginia's proportionality review is inadequate
and incomplete is because there is no comparison of the instant defendant
to other capital defendants during the mandated proportionality review.
Section 17.1-313 of the Virginia Code requires the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia to conduct proportionality review to determine "[w]hether the sen-
tence of death was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant."93 According to
this language, the Supreme Court of Virginia must not only determine that
a particular crime or criminal act comparatively warranted a sentence of
death, but also that a particular defendant, in comparison to other defen-
dants, is a fair candidate for death. This review of the defendant is manda-
tory. Without a comparative review of similar crimes involving similar
defendants the review is statutorily inadequate.
Under current practice there is no comparative review of the defendant
and other defendants in similar cases. On occasion the supreme court will
look at the defendant in the case under review by examining prior criminal
activity, home life, and personal traits showing criminal disposition. In
90. Id. at 689 n.4.
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
92. VA. CONST. art. I S 8.
93. S 17.1-313(C)(2).
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Ramdass v. Commonwealth,9 the Supreme Court of Virginia, while conduct-
ing proportionality review, discussed the defendant's criminal history, past
probation violations, duration of previous prison sentences, the fact that the
defendant, when arrested for a prior crime, was found by police sleeping
with a loaded revolver beside the bed, the length of time the defendant was
released before committing another crime, the malice involved in previous
crimes, and the atrociousness of the crime under review.9 Typically this
sort of review is conducted when the aggravating factor in the case under
review is "future dangerousness."' However, this review is not a compara-
tive one. It only identifies the instant defendant as "bad." It cannot decide
how his "badness" compares to that of other capitally convicted defendants.
In Peterson v. Commonwealth,97 Supreme Court of Virginia came the
closest to performing the actual comparative proportionality review man-
dated by section 17.1-313.98 The court, in reviewing whether Peterson's
death sentence was proportionate to that of other capital defendants, dis-
cussed the defendant's criminal record and compared it to the criminal
records of other capital defendants who were sentenced to death on the
"future dangerousness" predicate." This is a comparative review, but a very
limited one. It fails to include and compare any of the personal mitigation
evidence presented by each defendant.
Even if the court conducts a truncated comparative review of the
defendant, as in the Peterson case, that review suffers the same infirmities as
does comparative review of offenses. The defendants reviewed are mostly
defendants that have been sentenced to death. Thus, the determination of
whether the death sentence under review is proportionate is actually a
determination of whether the defendant under review is comparable to
94. 437 S.E.2d 566 (Va. 1993).
95. Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 566, 574 (Va. 1993).
96. Id. See also Dubois v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E.2d 636, 640 (Va. 1993) (discussing
the defendant's prior criminal record, the fact that in case under review defendant committed
murder while on mandatory parole, and malice displayed in present crime); Yeatts v.
Commonwealth, 410 S.E.2d 254, 267-68 (Va. 1991) (defendant was sentenced to death only
on "future dangerousness" predicate; in determination of proportionality, the supreme court
reviewed only cases where predicate for death was "future dangerousness" and underlying
felony was robbery; brief consideration of defendant's mental retardation in proportionality
review but no comparative review of other similar defendants was conducted; sentence of
death was not found to be disproportionate); Williams v. Commonwealth, 360 S.E.2d 361,
370 (Va. 1987) (defendant's prior criminal record and testimony from his mother explaining
that he was not a threat at home and she did not believe him to be a threat to others, testi-
mony from a female friend who had know the defendant for eleven years explaining that he
was never violent around her, and similar testimony of another woman that previously dated
the defendant were reviewed).
97. 302 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 1983).




other defendants who received a sentence of death. It is not an analysis of
whether juries generally impose death upon similar defendants. Rather it is
an analysis of whether juries have ever imposed death upon similar defen-
dants. In Jackson v. Comronuralth,1°° the trial court convicted the defen-
dant, a juvenile, of capital murder and five related felonies and sentenced
him to death on the "future dangerousness" predicate. 1 The defendant was
sixteen years old at the time he committed the murder and other felonies. 02
The Supreme Court of Virginia, on Jackson's direct appeal, conducted the
mandated proportionality review pursuant to section 17.1-313 of the Vir-
ginia Code." In its comparative review, the court compared the crime in
Jackson's case to crimes in other capital cases previously reviewed by the
Supreme Court of Virginia, paying "particular consideration to other capital
murder cases in which robbery or attempted robbery was the underlying
felony, and the death penalty was based only on the 'future dangerousness'
predicate.""° The court also considered the defendant, Jackson, during this
review; however, no comparative analysis was conducted.' The court
stated that "[ailthough Jackson was only 16 years old [sic] when he killed
Bonney, his criminal conduct on other occasions, especially the violent acts
he committed while (1) on probation, (2) free on bond, and (3) in jail await-
ing trial for these offenses, manifests an escalating pattern of violent criminal
behavior that compels us to conclude that the imposition of the death
penalty in this case is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases." 1" The court came to this conclusion without
looking at similar defendants. Although this review is better then no review
of the defendant at all, it is certainly incomplete. The court looked at the
defendant in the case at hand and determined that the sentence was propor-
tionate to those imposed on other defendants without comparing Jackson
to other similar defendants. The court simply reviewed the actions and
history of the defendant and determined that a sentence of death was not
excessive or disproportionate.' °
Justice Hassell wrote a partial dissent in Jackson in which he noted that
in its determination of proportionality the majority did not compare the
defendant to other similar defendants and that, consequently, the propor-
tionality review was ineffective, incomplete and produced an inaccurate
100. 499 S.E.2d 538 (Va. 1998).
101. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 538, 542-43 (Va. 1998).
102. Id. at 542.
103. Id. at 542-43.
104. Id. at 554.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 555.
107. Id.
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result.' Justice Hassell stated that since 1987 the trial courts have only
convicted ten sixteen-year-olds of capital murder." 9 Of those ten, Jackson
was the only one sentenced to death."0 Justice Hassell argued that in
conducting its proportionality review the majority erred because the court
did not conduct a comparative review of the defendant and other similar
defendants involved in similar crimes."' Justice Hassell went on to review
cases in which other sixteen-year-old defendants received a capital convic-
tion and compared them to the case at hand."' In this comparative review,
Justice Hassell determined that in some cases in which the trial court con-
victed a sixteen-year-old defendant of capital murder and imposed a life
sentence, the crime and the surrounding facts were more egregious than the
case under review.1 He also noted that many of these sixteen-year-old
defendants had juvenile criminal histories similar to Jackson's. In none of
these cases involving a sixteen-year-old defendant did the defendant receive
a sentence of death. Justice Hassell determined that "[u]pon comparison of
Jackson's sentence of death, along with his criminal history and facts sur-
rounding his case, to the facts and criminal histories of other defendants
who committed capital offenses at age 16, [sic] [it] can only [be] conclude[d]
that Jackson's sentence of death is both excessive and disproportionate in
violation of Code S [17.1-313(C)(2)].""1 4 This is precisely the form of review
mandated by section 17.1-313'of the Virginia Code.
In sum, the Supreme Court of Virginia almost always fails to conduct
this part of the comparative proportionality review mandated by section
17.1-313 of the Virginia Code.1 By failing to conduct the mandated review
of a sentence of death, considering both the crime and the defendant, the
court violates the defendant's rights under section 17.1-313. Every determi-
nation of proportionality conducted by the Supreme Court of Virginia
necessarily is conducted in error unless the court comparatively reviews
both the crime and the defendant and, in doing so, considers a representative
cross section of capital cases in which the defendants received sentences of
both life and death.
IIL Conclusion
Proportionality review, in its present form, remains incomplete,
inaccurate, and violative of a defendant's rights to a fair and accurate deter-
108. Id. at 557 (Hassel, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 555.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 555-56.
113. Id.




mination of whether an imposed sentence of death is excessive or dispropor-
tionate. Because the circuit courts are not conducting a presentence propor-
tionality review, because the Supreme Court of Virginia is not conducting
a comparative review of defendants, and because in analyzing what sentence
juries generally impose for specific conduct, the Supreme Court of Virginia
does not use a fair, adequate and reflective cross section of capital cases, the
courts have consistently denied defendants an accurate determination of
proportionality in violation of rights accrued through section 17.1-313 of
the Virginia Code. The trial courts have repeatedly violated the defendant's
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law by acting beyond their
jurisdiction in imposing a sentence without conducting Virginia's statutorily
mandated comparative proportionality review.
To assure an accurate and complete determination of the proportional-
ity of a death sentence, several changes to the present review are necessary.
First, it is essential that all circuit courts conduct the mandated proportional-
ity review considering both the crime and the defendant before the imposi-
tion of sentence in a capital case. Second, a full and unabridged collection
of all cases resulting in a conviction of capital murder with which the
Supreme Court of Virginia can use in comparative proportionality is essen-
tial to the fairness of the system and the rights of the defendant of every
capital case. Unless such unabridged collection is used in a determination
of proportionality, each determination is necessarily inaccurate. And
finally, each proportionality determination is necessarily incomplete with-
out comparative review of the defendant. Until these changes are made to
the present system of proportionality review, the review itself does not
comply with the mandates of the statute. The defendant of any capital
conviction has an unequivocal right to a complete and accurate determina-
tion of whether a death sentence is excessive or disproportionate.
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